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Abstract
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) gen-
eralizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation
devices. Aumann showed an example of a
game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this
game, in which the agents’ surplus (expected
sum of payoffs) is greater than their surplus
in all mixed-strategy equilibria. Following
the idea initiated by the price of anarchy lit-
erature (Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, 1999;
Papadimitriou, 2001) this suggests the study
of two major measures for the value of corre-
lation in a game with non-negative payoffs:
1. The ratio between the maximal sur-
plus obtained in a correlated equilibrium
to the maximal surplus obtained in a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. We refer to
this ratio as the mediation value.
2. The ratio between the maximal surplus
to the maximal surplus obtained in a
correlated equilibrium. We refer to this
ratio as the enforcement value.
In this work we initiate the study of the medi-
ation and enforcement values, providing sev-
eral general results on the value of correla-
tion as captured by these concepts. We also
present a set of results for the more spe-
cialized case of congestion games (Rosenthal,
1973), a class of games that received a lot of
attention in the recent literature.
1 Introduction
One of the most famous and fruitful contributions to
game theory has been the introduction of correlated
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equilibrium by Aumann (1974) . Consider a game in
strategic form. A correlated strategy is a probability
distribution over the set of strategy profiles, where a
strategy profile is a vector of strategies, one for each
player. A correlated strategy is utilized as follows: A
strategy profile is selected according to the distribu-
tion, and every player is informed about her strategy
in the profile. This selected strategy for the player is
interpreted as a recommendation of play. Correlated
strategies are most natural, since they capture the idea
of a system administrator/reliable party who can rec-
ommend behavior but can not enforce it. Hence, cor-
related strategies make perfect sense in the context
of congestion control, load balancing, trading, etc. A
correlated strategy is called a correlated equilibrium
if it is better off for every player to obey her recom-
mended strategy if she believes that all other players
obey their recommended strategies 1. A major poten-
tial benefit of correlated equilibrium is to attempt to
improve the social welfare of selfish players. In this
paper, the social welfare obtained in a mixed-strategy
profile is defined to be the expected sum of the pay-
offs of the players, and it is referred to as the surplus
obtained in this profile.
A striking example introduced in Aumann’s seminal
paper (Aumann, 1974) is of a two-player two-strategy
game, where the surplus obtained in a correlated equi-
librium is higher than the surplus obtained in every
mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game. As a result,
Aumann’s example suggests that correlation may be a
way to improve upon social welfare while still assuming
that players are rational in the classical game-theoretic
sense.2
1Every correlated strategy defines a Bayesian game, in
which the private signal of every player is her recommended
strategy. It is a correlated equilibrium if obeying the rec-
ommended strategy by every player is a pure-strategy equi-
librium in the Bayesian game.
2Other advantages are purely computational ones. As
has been recently shown correlated equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time even for structured representa-
A modification of Aumann’s example serves us as a
motivating example:
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Aumann’s Example
In this game, there are three mixed-strategy equilib-
rium profiles. Two of them are obtained with pure
strategies, (a1, b1), and (a2, b2). The surplus in each
of these pure-strategy equilibrium profiles equals six.
There is an additional mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which, every player chooses each of her strategies with
equal probabilities. The surplus obtained in this pro-
file equals 5 (= 14 (6 + 0 + 8 + 6)) because every entry
in the matrix is played with probability 14 . Hence,
the maximal surplus in a mixed-strategy equilibrium
equals 6. Consider the following correlated strategy:
a probability of 1/3 is assigned to every pure strategy
profile but (a1, b2). This correlated strategy is a corre-
lated equilibrium. Indeed, when the row player is rec-
ommended to play a1 she knows that the other player
is recommended to play b1, and therefore she strictly
prefers to play a1. When the row player is recom-
mended to play a2 the conditional probability of each
of the columns is half, and therefore she weakly prefers
to play a2. Similar argument applied to the column
player shows that the correlated strategy is indeed a
correlated equilibrium. The surplus associated with
this correlated equilibrium equals 203 (=
1
3 (6 + 8 + 6)).
The above discussion suggests one may wish to con-
sider the value of correlation in games. In order to
address the challenge of studying the value of correla-
tion, we tackle two fundamental issues:
• How much can the society/system gain by adding
a correlation device, where we assume that with-
out such a device the agents play a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
• How much does the society/system loose from the
fact that the correlation device can only recom-
mend (and can not enforce) a course of action?
We introduce two measures, namely the mediation
value and the enforcement value. The mediation value
will measure the ratio between the maximal surplus
in a correlated equilibrium to the maximal surplus in
a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Notice that the higher
tions of games Kakade et al. (2003); Papadimitriou (2005).
this number is, the more correlation helps. This con-
cept relates to the price of anarchy3 as follows: When
translating the definition of price of anarchy to games
with payoffs and not with costs,4 the price of anarchy is
the ratio between the maximal surplus to the minimal
surplus obtained in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The
higher this number is, the value of a center is higher,
where a center can enforce a course of play. Hence,
the price of anarchy could have been called the value
of a center with respect to anarchy, where a center can
dictate a play, and when anarchy is measured by the
worst social outcome reached by rational and selfish
agents. The mediation value is the value of a center
with respect to anarchy, where a center is reliable and
can recommend a play, and anarchy is measured by
the best social outcome reached by rational and self-
ish agents.5
In Aumman’s example it can be shown that the corre-
lated equilibrium introduced above is the best corre-
lated equilibrium, i.e. it attains the maximal surplus
among all correlated equilibria in the game. Hence,
the mediation value of Aumann’s game is 109 .
The enforcement value measures the ratio between the
maximal surplus to the maximal surplus in a correlated
equilibrium. That is, it is the value of a super-center
with respect to a center who can just use correlated
devices in equilibrium. As the maximal surplus in Au-
mann game is 8, the enforcement value in this game
equals 65 .
In order for the above measures to make sense we con-
sider games with non-negative payoffs.
In this paper we establish general and basic results
concerning the measures defined above. We will con-
sider the mediation ( enforcement) value of classes of
games, where the mediation ( enforcement) value of a
class of games is defined as the greatest lower bound
of the mediation (enforcement) values of the games in
the class.
We start by considering general games. Aumann’s ex-
3The concept of the price of anarchy has received much
attention in the recent computer science literature. See
e.g., (Czumaj & Vocking, 2002; Marvonicolas & Spirakis,
2001; Roughgarden, 2002; Roughgarden & Tardos, 2002).
4In many situations it is indeed natural to deal with
non-negative costs rather than payoffs. Such models re-
quire special treatment. Interestingly, it can be shown that
there are classes of games where the price of anarchy is
bounded when dealing with costs while it is unbounded
when dealing with payoffs. Similarly for the mediation
value. This point will be further discussed in the full pa-
per.
5Anarchy means playing in a mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. The phenomenon of multiple equilibria forces a mod-
elling choice. Currently the choice between the best and
worst social outcomes is a matter of taste.
ample implies that the mediation value of the class of
two-player two-strategy (2× 2) games is at least 10/9.
We first show that the mediation value of this class is
4/3. Hence, the mediation value in any 2× 2 game is
bounded from above by 4/3, and this upper bound is
tight. Next we move to show the power of correlation
in more complex games. In order to do so we consider
the two possible minimal extensions of 2 × 2 games:
Two-player games with three strategies for one of the
players and two strategies for the other, and three-
player games with two strategies for all players. We
show that the mediation values of the games in each
of these classes of games are unbounded. That is, the
mediation value equals ∞. This implies that the me-
diation value is ∞ for the class of games in which, at
least one agent has three strategies and for the class of
games with at least three players. Again, this should
be interpreted as a positive result, showing the extreme
power of correlation.
Considering the enforcement value, we first show that
it equals ∞ for the class of 2× 2 games. Moreover, in
a setup with three players we show that the enforce-
ment value of the class of three-player games without
dominated strategies equals ∞.
Following these general results, we consider the impor-
tant class of congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973; Mon-
derer & Shapley, 1996). Indeed, this class of games is
perhaps the most applicable to the game theory and
CS synergy. In particular, results regarding the price
of anarchy have been obtained for congestion games.
We restrict our discussion to simple congestion games.
In a simple congestion game there is a set of facilities.
Every facility j is associated with a payoff function
wj . Every player chooses a facility, say facility j, and
receives wj(k), where k is the number of players that
chose facility j.
For completeness we first deal with the simple case
where we have only two players. In this case we show
that if the players can choose among only two facili-
ties then the mediation value is bounded from above
by 4/3, and that this bound is achieved. In the more
general case, where there are m facilities, the media-
tion value is bounded by 2. However, if we consider
facilities with non-increasing payoffs (i.e. a player’s
payoff is monotonically non-increasing in the number
of agents using its selected facility) then the mediation
value is 1.
We then move to the more general case of simple con-
gestion games, where there are n ≥ 2 players. We show
that for the case of three players, even if there are two
facilities with non-increasing payoffs then the media-
tion value is unbounded. However, if we have n players
and the two facilities have non-increasing linear payoff
functions then the mediation value is bounded from
above by
√
5+1
2 . On the other hand, we show that
the mediation value can be higher than 1 consider-
ing even two symmetric (identical) facilities with non-
increasing payoffs. This further illustrates the power
of correlation. Nevertheless, we also show that if we
have m symmetric facilities, where the facility pay-
off functions obey a concavity requirement, the best
mixed-strategy equilibrium obtains the maximal sur-
plus, and therefore both the mediation value and the
enforcement value are 1.
Finally, we study the enforcement value in the natu-
ral case where we have n players who choose among
m symmetric facilities (where the payoff function as-
sociated with a facility may be arbitrary). We give
a general characterization of the cases where the en-
forcement value is 1, and as a result determine the
situations where correlation allows obtaining maximal
surplus. Few other results about the enforcement value
are obtained as well.
Most of our proofs are omitted from this paper due
to lack of space. The proofs rely mainly on duality
theorems in linear programming. In order to illustrate
these techniques we added a short appendix with a
discussion of these techniques and a short sketch of
proof of one of our theorems.
2 Basic Definitions
A finite game Γ = (N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) in strategic
form is defined as follows. Let N be a nonempty finite
set of players. For each i ∈ N , let Si be a finite set of
strategies of player i. Let S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn be
the set of strategy profiles (n-tuples). An element of
S is s = (si)i∈N . For each i ∈ N and s ∈ S let s−i =
(s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ...sn) denote the strategies played by
everyone but i. Thus s = (s−i, si). For each player
i ∈ N , let ui : S → R be the payoff function of player
i. ui(s) is the payoff of player i when the profile of
strategies s is played. Γ is called a nonnegative game
if all payoffs to all players are nonnegative, i.e ui : S →
R+.
A player can also randomize among her strategies by
using a mixed strategy - a distribution over her set of
strategies. For any finite set C, ∆(C) denotes the set
of probability distributions over C. Thus P i = ∆(Si)
is the set of mixed strategies of player i. For every
pi ∈ P i and every si ∈ Si, pi(si) is the probability
that player i plays strategy si. Every strategy si ∈ Si
is, with the natural identification, a mixed strategy
psi ∈ P i in which
psi(ti) =
{
1 ti = si
0 ti 6= si.
psi is called a pure strategy, and si is interchangeably
called a strategy and a pure strategy (when it is iden-
tified with psi). Let P = P 1 × P 2 × · · · × Pn be the
set of mixed strategy profiles.
Unless otherwise specified we will assume that N =
{1, 2, ...., n}, n ≥ 1.
Any µ ∈ ∆(S) is called a correlated strategy. Every
mixed strategy profile p ∈ P can be interpreted as a
correlated strategy µp in the following way. For every
strategy profile s ∈ S let µp(s) =
∏n
i=1 p
i(si). With
slightly abuse of notation, for every µ ∈ ∆(S), we
denote by ui(µ) the expected payoff of player i when
the correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(S) is played, that is:
ui(µ) =
∑
s∈S
ui(s)µ(s). (1)
Whenever necessary we identify p with µp. Naturally,
for every p ∈ P let ui(p) = ui(µp). Hence ui(p) is the
expected payoff of player i when the mixed strategy p
is played.
We say that p ∈ P is a mixed-strategy equilibrium if
ui(p−i, pi) ≥ ui(p−i, qi) for every player i ∈ N and for
every qi ∈ P i.
Definition 2.1 (Aumann 1974, 1987) A correlated
strategy µ ∈ ∆(S) is a correlated equilibrium of Γ if
and only if for all i ∈ N and all si, ti ∈ Si:∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(s−i, si)[ui(s−i, si)− ui(s−i, ti)] ≥ 0. (2)
It is well-known and easily verified that every mixed-
strategy equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium. Let
u(µ) =
∑n
i=1 u
i(µ). The value u(µ) is called the sur-
plus at µ. Let N(Γ) be the set of all mixed-strategy
equilibria in Γ and let C(Γ) be the set of all correlated
equilibria in Γ. We define vC(Γ) and vN (Γ) as follows:
vC(Γ) , max{u(µ) : µ ∈ C(Γ)},
vN (Γ) , max{u(p) : p ∈ N(Γ)}.
Note that vN (Γ) and vC(Γ) are well defined due to the
compactness of N(Γ) and C(Γ) respectively, and the
continuity of u. Define opt(Γ) (the maximal surplus)
as follows:
opt(Γ) , max{u(µ) : µ ∈ ∆(S)} = max{u(s) : s ∈ S}.
The mediation value of a nonnegative game Γ is de-
fined as follows:
MV (Γ) , vC(Γ)
vN (Γ)
.
If both vN (Γ) = 0 and vC(Γ) = 0 we define MV (Γ)
to be 1. If vN (Γ) = 0 and vC(Γ) > 0 then MV (Γ) is
defined to be ∞. Denote by EV (Γ) the enforcement
value of a nonnegative game Γ. That is,
EV (Γ) , opt(Γ)
vC(Γ)
.
If both vC(Γ) = 0 and opt(Γ) = 0 then we define
EV (Γ) to be 1. If vC(Γ) = 0 and opt(Γ) > 0 then
EV (Γ) is defined to be∞. Finally, for a class of games
C we denote
MV (C) , sup
Γ∈C
MV (Γ); and EV (C) , sup
Γ∈C
EV (Γ).
We will also make use of the following notation and
definitions. Let G be the class of all nonnegative games
in strategic form. For m1,m2, ...,mn ≥ 1 denote by
Gm1×m2×···×mn ⊆ G the class of all games with n play-
ers in which |Si| = mi for every player i. Let si, ti ∈ Si
be pure strategies of player i. We say that si weakly
dominates (or just dominates) ti, and ti is weakly dom-
inated (or dominated) by si if for all s−i ∈ S−i
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(ti, s−i),
where at least one inequality is strict. We say that si
strictly dominates ti, and ti is strictly dominated by si
if all of the above inequalities are strict. If ui(si, s−i) =
u(ti, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i then we will say that si and
ti are equivalent strategies for player i.
3 Results for General Games
We now deal with general games in strategic form.
3.1 The Mediation Value
In this section we show the overwhelming power of
correlation in general games. However, we start with
extending Aumann’s result on the power of correlation
in 2× 2 games.
3.1.1 Two-person two-strategy games
Aumann’s example shows that a mediation value of 109
can be obtained in a 2×2 game. In order to study the
value of correlation we prove:
Theorem 3.1 MV (G2×2) = 43 .
We now show a family of games in which the mediation
value approaches the above 43 bound. Consider the
family of games Γx shown in Figure 1 (a variant of
Aumann’s example) where x > 1.
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Figure 1
In this game the pure strategy profiles (a1, b1) and
(a2, b2) are in equilibrium and u(a1, b1) = u(a2, b2) =
x+ 1. There is one more equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies where each player assigns the probability 0.5 to
each of her strategies, which yields a surplus lower than
x + 1. The correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(S) where each
of the strategy profiles (a1, b1) ,(a2, b1) and (a2, b2) is
played with equal probability 1/3 is in equilibrium and
u(µ) = 4x3 . µ obtains the largest surplus among all cor-
related equilibria in the game (see the proof). Hence
MV (Γx) = 4x3(x+1) . Therefore MV (Γx) → 43 when
x→∞. 
3.1.2 General Games
The above theorem shows that the mediation value of
the class of 2 × 2 games is finite. A major question
we face is whether such finite bound exists for more
general classes of games. We now show that, perhaps
surprisingly, the mediation value equals ∞ if we con-
sider slightly more complex games. In particular, if
we allow one of the players in a 2-player game to have
at least three strategies, while the other remains with
two strategies, then the mediation value already equals
∞. Similarly, if we allow three players each with two
strategies then the mediation value, again equals ∞.
Together, these results show the power of correlation
when we move beyond 2× 2 games.6
Theorem 3.2 MV (Gm1×m2) = ∞ for every
m1,m2 ≥ 2 such that max(m1,m2) ≥ 3.
Theorem 3.3 MV (Gm1×···×mn) =∞ for every n ≥ 3
and for every m1,m2, · · ·,mn ≥ 2.
3.2 The Enforcement Value
We first show that the enforcement value may be un-
bounded even on classes of small games.
Theorem 3.4 EV (Gm1×···×mn) = ∞ for every n ≥
2, and for every m1,m2 ≥ 2.
6The results presented in this paper showing that the
mediation value may be ∞, can also be established when
we assume that the payoffs are uniformly bounded, e.g.
when all payoffs are in the interval [0, 1]. This fact, which
strengthen our results even further, will be discussed in the
full paper.
The proof of Theorem 3.4 is shown using a parametric
version of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
This game has the property of possessing a strictly
dominant strategy for each player. In the next theorem
we show that dominance is not necessary for obtaining
an unbounded enforcement value.
Theorem 3.5 sup{EV (Γ)|Γ ∈ G2×2×2,
no player has a strictly dominant strategy} =∞.
4 Simple Congestion Games
In this section we explore the mediation and enforce-
ment values in simple congestion games. We first need
a few notations and definitions.
A congestion form F = (N,M, (Xi)i∈N , (wj)j∈M ) is
defined as follows. N is a nonempty set of players and
M is a nonempty set of facilities. Unless otherwise
specified we let M = {1, 2, ...,m}. For i ∈ N , let Xi be
the set of strategies of player i, where each Ai ∈ Xi is a
nonempty subset of M . For j ∈M let wj ∈ R{1,2,...,n}
be the facility payoff function, where wj(k) denotes the
payoff of each user of facility j, if there are exactly k
users. A congestion form is nonnegative if for every j ∈
M wj is nonnegative. A congestion form is simple if
for every i ∈ N, Xi = {{1}, {2}, ..., {m}}. Let S be
the class of all nonnegative simple congestion forms
and denote by Sn×m ⊆ S the class of all nonnegative
simple congestion forms with n players andm facilities.
Every congestion form F = (N,M, (Xi)i∈N , (wj)j∈M )
defines a congestion game ΓF = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N )
where N and Xi are as above and (ui)i∈N is defined
as follows.
Let X = ×i∈NXi. For every A = (A1, A2, ..., An) ∈ X
and every j ∈M let σj(A) = |{i ∈ N : j ∈ Ai}| be the
number of users of facility j.
Define ui : X → R by
ui(A) =
∑
j∈Ai
wj(σj(A)). (3)
Observe that if F is simple then ui(A) = wAi(σAi(A)).
We will say that a facility j is non-increasing if wj(k)
is a non-increasing function of k. Define SNn×m ⊆
Sn×m as follows:
SN n×m ,
{F ∈ Sn×m|all facilities in F are non-increasing}.
We will call a facility j linear if there exist a constant
dj such that wj(k + 1)− wj(k) = dj for every k ≤ 1.
A congestion form is called facility symmetric or just
symmetric if wj ≡ wk ∀j, k ∈M . Let In×m ⊆ Sn×m
be defined by
In×m , {F ∈ Sn×m| F is facility symmetric }.
Define IN n×m ⊆ In×m as follows:
IN n×m ,
{F ∈ In×m| all facilities of F are non-increasing}.
4.1 The Mediation Value
Although congestion games are especially interesting
when the number of players is large, we first start with
some results for the case where we have only two play-
ers, extending upon the results in the previous section.
Following that, we will consider the more general n-
player case.
4.1.1 The two-player case (n = 2)
In theorem 3.1 we showed that 43 is a tight upper bound
for the mediation value of games that belong to G2×2.
Hence, obviously, 43 is an upper bound for the media-
tion value of simple congestion games with two players
and two facilities, i.e. games generated by congestion
forms in S2×2. We first show that this is also a tight
upper bound.
Theorem 4.1 MV ({ΓF |F ∈ S2×2}) = 43 .
Consider now the more general case where, the two
agents can choose among m facilities. We show:
Theorem 4.2 MV ({ΓF |F ∈ S2×m}) ≤ 2.
Notice that our results imply that correlation helps al-
ready when we have congestion games with only two
players. However, correlation does not increase so-
cial welfare when all facility payoff functions are non-
increasing:
Theorem 4.3 MV (ΓF ) = 1 for every form F ∈
SN 2×m .
4.1.2 Simple congestion games with n players
In Section 3 we have shown that correlation has an un-
bounded value when considering arbitrary games. We
next consider the effects of correlation in the context
of simple congestion games. We can show:
Theorem 4.4 MV ({ΓF |F ∈ SNn×m}) = ∞ for ev-
ery n ≥ 3 and for every m ≥ 2.
The above result illustrates the power of correlation
when we consider the context of simple congestion
games. Indeed, the result shows that even if there
are three players and two facilities with non-increasing
payoff functions the mediation value is unbounded.
However, if we require that the facility payoff func-
tions are linear, then the following upper bound can
be obtained:
Theorem 4.5 sup{MV (ΓF )|F ∈ SNn×2,
all facilities of F are linear} ≤ φ, where φ = (√5 +
1)/2.
Proving that φ is an upper bound is highly non-trivial.
Unfortunately, we do not know what is the least upper
bound. However, the example below shows that the
mediation value can be at least 98 .
Example 1: Let n = 3, M = {f, g}, wf = (24, 12, 0)
and wg = (8, 8, 8). It can be shown that vN (Γ) = 32,
and it can be obtained, both in a pure-strategy equi-
librium (two players choose f and the other player
chooses g) and in a mixed- strategy equilibrium. Con-
sider the following correlated strategy µ. Assign the
probability 16 to each strategy profile in which, not all
players choose the same facility. µ is in equilibrium
and the surplus at µ is 36. 
The above study shows that correlation is extremely
helpful in the context of (even non-increasing) conges-
tion games. We next show that correlation is helpful
even in the narrow class of facility symmetric forms
with non-increasing facilities.
Theorem 4.6 MV ({ΓF |F ∈ INn×2}) > 1 for every
n ≥ 4.
The case of symmetric forms with non-increasing fa-
cilities is quite restricting one. As a result, the fact
the mediation value may be greater than 1 in this case
is quite encouraging. However, if we further restrict
the setting to obey some concavity requirements, the
above does not hold any more. Formally, we say that
a function v : {1, 2, ..., N} → R+ is concave if for every
integer k ≥ 2 v(k + 1)− v(k) ≤ v(k)− v(k − 1). We
can now show:
Theorem 4.7 Let F ∈ INn×m and assume n ≥ m.
Define v by v(k) = kg(k). If v is concave then there
exists an equilibrium in ΓF which obtains the maximal
surplus.
4.2 The Enforcement Value
We already know that the enforcement value is un-
bounded on the class of Prisoner’s Dilemma games
(notice that a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a simple
congestion game). In addition, we show:
Theorem 4.8 sup{EV (Γ)|F ∈ SN 3×2,
there are no strictly dominant strategies} =∞.
The above result shows that the enforcement value
may be unbounded already on the class of simple con-
gestion games with non-increasing facility payoff func-
tions. It turns out that it is unbounded even when
restricting the games to those who are generated by
symmetric congestion forms with non-increasing facil-
ity payoff functions:
Theorem 4.9 limn→∞EV ({ΓF |F ∈ INn×2}) =∞.
Although the enforcement value may be unbounded
when we have facility symmetric congestion forms, it
is of great interest to characterize general cases of this
natural setup where the correlation enables to get close
to the maximal value. More specifically, we now char-
acterize the cases where correlation allows to actually
obtain the related maximal value, i.e. the enforcement
value is 1.
The following characterization makes use of the follow-
ing definition and notations. Let F be a simple con-
gestion form with n players and m facilities. A conges-
tion vector pi = pi(n,m) is an m-tuple pi = (pij)j∈M ,
where pi1, pi2, ..., pim ∈ Z∗ (nonnegative integers) and∑m
j=1 pij = n. pi represents the situation where pij
players choose facility j. Every strategy profile A ∈ X
uniquely determines a congestion vector piA. Note that
there are
(
n
pi1
)(
n−pi1
pi2
) · · · (n−∑m−2j=1 pijpim−1 ) strategy profiles
in the game ΓF that correspond to a congestion vec-
tor pi, and denote by Bpi the set of all such strategy
profiles. Thus Bpi = {A ∈ X|piA = pi}. Given a
congestion vector pi, all strategy profiles in Bpi have
the same surplus which we denote by u(pi). Therefore
u(pi) =
∑
j∈M pijwj(pij) where wj(0) is defined to be
zero for every j ∈ M . We will say that a congestion
vector pi is in equilibrium if every strategy profile in
Bpi is in equilibrium. Let τ : M → M be a one to
one function and let τpi = (τpi)j∈M be the congestion
vector defined by (τpi)j = piτ(j). Let F ∈ In×m. In
this case u(pi) = u(τpi). Let Api =
⋃
τ Bτpi. Observe
that Bpi ⊆ Api. Both sets are finite and therefore their
elements can be ordered.
Theorem 4.10 Let F ∈ In×m. Then vC(ΓF ) =
opt(ΓF ) if and only if there exist a congestion vec-
tor pi = (pi1, ..., pim) and a correlated equilibrium µ ∈
C(ΓF ) such that:
1. u(pi) = opt(ΓF ).
2. µ is distributed uniformly over all elements (strat-
egy profiles) in Api.
The proof of the above result show implicitly the ex-
istence of many situations where correlation allows
to obtain the maximal surplus, while (without cor-
relation) the best mixed-strategy equilibrium behaves
poorly. We demonstrate this by the following example.
Example 2: Let F ∈ I6×2. Let wj =
(1.5, 1, 4, 4.5, 4.5, 3) for every j ∈ M . The maximal
surplus is obtained in any strategy profile that belongs
to Api1 and Api2 where pi1 = (3, 3) and pi2 = (1, 5). It is
easy to see that the both pi1 and pi2 are not in equilib-
rium. Let ξ1 and ξ2 be correlated strategies that are
uniformly distributed over Api1 and Api2 respectively.
In order to check if there exists a correlated equilib-
rium that obtains the maximal surplus it is enough to
check whether ξ1 or ξ2 are correlated equilibria. In-
deed, one can easily check that ξ2 is a correlated equi-
librium whose surplus equals the maximal surplus. 
Appendix
In this section we give a sketch of proof for Theorem
4.5, for illustrative purposes. One of the tools we use
is linear programming. It is well-known that for every
game in strategic form, Γ, C(Γ) is exactly the set of
feasible solutions for the following linear program (P̂ ).
Moreover, µ ∈ C(Γ) is an optimal solution for (P̂ ) if
and only if u(µ) = vC(Γ).
max
∑
s∈S µ(s)u(s)
P̂ s.t.
µ(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S,∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1,∑
s−i∈S−i µ(s)[u
i(ti, s−i) − ui(s)] ≤ 0∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈
Si,∀ti ∈ Si, ti 6= si
The dual problem has one decision variable for each
constraint in the primal. We let αi(ti|si) denote the
dual variable associated with the primal constraint:∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(s)[ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)] ≤ 0.
Let β denote the dual variable associated with the pri-
mal constraint
∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1. Let α = (α
i)i∈N where
αi = (αi(ti|si))ti,si∈Si , ti 6= si. The dual problem
may be written:
minβ
D̂ s.t.
αi(ti|si) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Si, ∀ti ∈ Si, ti 6= si,∑
i∈N
∑
si 6=ti∈Si α
i(ti|si)[ui(ti, s−i) − ui(s)] + β ≥
u(s)∀s ∈ S
It is well known that problems P̂ and D̂ are feasible
and bounded, and their objective values equal vC(Γ).
Proof of theorem 4.5(sketch):
Let M = {f, g} and let wf and wg be the facil-
ity payoff functions of f and g respectively. W.l.o.g
wf (1) ≥ wg(1). Let df = wf (k) − wf (k + 1) and
dg = wg(k) − wg(k + 1) for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1.
Let pik = (n − k, k) be the congestion vector where
k players choose g and n − k players choose f . Let
s be the largest integer such that the congestion vec-
tor pis = (n − s, s) is in equilibrium (a pure strategy
equilibrium exists (Rosenthal, 1973)). The surplus in
the above equilibrium is u(pis). If s ∈ {n, 0} then the
mediation value is one. We prove the following two
claims:
Claim 1: u(pij) ≤ u(pis) for every j ≤ s.
Claim 2: For every k > s every strategy profile in the
following form is in equilibrium: n− k players choose
f with probability one, and the other k players choose
g with probability pk =
wg(1)−wf (n)
(k−1)(df+dg) . The surplus of
such a strategy profile is nwf (n) + pkdf ((n − k)k +
k(k − 1)).
We continue: let qs+1 be a strategy profile such as in
claim 2. In order to prove the theorem we use the dual
program Dˆ. Let (α, β) be a feasible solution for the
dual problem, then by the duality theorem β ≥ vC(Γ).
Let Z = φmax{u(pis), u(qs+1)}. We show that there
exist a feasible solution for the dual problem where
β ≤ Z.
Let x = αi(f |g) and αi(g|f) = 0 for every i ∈ N . The
constraints of the dual program reduce to (call this
system D̂1):
D̂1 k(wf (n − k + 1) − wg(k))x ≥ u(pik) − β, k =
1, ..., n
x ≥ 0
Consider the case where there is at least one k such
that u(pik) > Z. Let kˆ be such that u(pikˆ) > Z. Thus
kˆ > s (by claim 1). If there exists a feasible solution
to D̂1 where β ≤ Z, it must be that x ≥ 0. Therefore
we can remove the constraint x ≥ 0 from D̂1. Call the
new set of constraints (without x ≥ 0) D̂2.
By Farkas lemma, D̂2 has a solution if and only if the
following program doesn’t have a solution:
P̂1
∑n
k=1 ykk(wf (n− k + 1)− wg(k)) = 0∑n
k=1 yk(u(pik)− β) > 0
yk ≥ 0 k = 1, ..., n
W.l.o.g let y = (y1, ..., yn) be a probability distribu-
tion. Let Y be the random variable where yk = P (Y =
k) k = 1, ..., n. Suppose that there exist a vector y
that satisfies the first constraint. From the first con-
straint we obtain:
EY ≤ wg(1)− wf (n) + df + dg
(df + dg)
≤ s+ 1 (4)
We proceed with the second constraint. It remains
to show that
∑n
k=1 yku(pik) ≤ β for any β ≤ Z. We
obtain that:
n∑
k=1
yku(pik) = EY (wf (1)− wf (n)) + nwf (n). (5)
We distinguish between two cases: (i) ps+1 < 1/φ. (ii)
ps+1 ≥ 1/φ.
(i) ps+1 < 1/φ implies that (wg(1) − wf (n))/(df +
dg) ≤ s/φ. From (4) EY ≤ sφ + 1. Let β = Mu(pis)
where M ≥ 1. We show that if the second constraint is
satisfied then every M ≥ φ will contradict that EY ≤
s
φ + 1. (ii) Let ps+1 ≥ 1/φ. From (4) we have EY ≤
s+ 1. Let β = Mu(qs+1) where M ≥ 1. We show that
if the second constraint is satisfied then every M ≥ φ
contradicts that EY ≤ s+ 1. 
References
Aumann, R. 1974. Subjectivity and Correlation in
Randomized Strategies. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 1:67–96.
Czumaj, A., and Vocking, B. 2002. Tight Bounds For
Worst Case Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 13th
Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 413–
420.
Kakade, S.; Kearns, M.; Langford, J.; and Ortiz, L.
2003. Correlated Equilibria in Graphical Games.
In Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Elec-
tronic commerce, 42–47.
Koutsoupias, E., and Papadimitriou, C. 1999. Worst-
Case Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 33rd Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing, 404–413.
Marvonicolas, M., and Spirakis, P. 2001. The Price of
Selfish Routing. In Proceedings of the 33rd Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing, 510–519.
Monderer, D., and Shapley, L. 1996. Potential Games.
Games and Economic Behavior 14:124–143.
Papadimitriou, C. 2001. Algorithms, Games, and the
Internet. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Sci-
ence, 749–753.
Papadimitriou, C. 2005. Computing correlated equi-
libria in multiplayer games. to appear in the pro-
ceedings of STOC 2005.
Rosenthal, R. 1973. A Class of Games Possessing
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 2:65–67.
Roughgarden, T., and Tardos, E. 2002. How Bad is
Selfish Routing. Journal of the ACM 49(2):236–259.
Roughgarden, T. 2002. Selfish Routing. Ph.D. Disser-
tation, Cornell University.
